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Introduction
Amsterdam as a financial centre has always appealed to the imagination of historians. About twenty five years ago Braudel described brilliantly how Amsterdam around 1600 took the place of Antwerp and Genua as the financial centre of the world until London would succeed it since about 1800.​[1]​ Shortly thereafter Riley published his detailed study about the heyday of Amsterdam’s international finance in the eighteenth century.​[2]​ Not only Amsterdam’s role in commercial finance and international government loans, but also the development of Holland’s public debt has attracted much attention. In 1986 Tracy published his classic A financial revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands in which he attributed the origins of Holland’s famous public credit to institutional developments in the middle of the sixteenth century. During the last decade some new studies have been published which pay attention to the period of Amsterdam’s rise as a commercial and financial centre.​[3]​ Points of debate are the role of Antwerp merchants and the relative role of the private and the government sector in the development of Amsterdam’s capital market. 
In this contribution I will try to evaluate some characteristics of the development of Holland’s public credit and Amsterdam’s capital market between 1585 and 1609. In 1585 the fall of Antwerp and the subsequent closure of the Scheldt by the rebels against Spain brought the downturn of Antwerp’s role in the commercial and financial world, after which many Antwerp merchants went to Amsterdam. In the same year Amsterdam decided, for the first time since it had joined - in 1578 - the Dutch revolt against Spain that had started in 1572, to provide for part of its share in war expenditure by means of voluntary loans from its citizens. A major event in the development of the Amsterdam capital market was the foundation of the East India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC) in 1602 by means of share subscriptions amounting to more than six million guilders, at a time when total yearly tax revenue in the province of Holland was less than six million and Holland’s total government debt amounted to perhaps about ten million.​[4]​ In 1609 the first phase of the Revolt came to an end with the Twelve-Year Truce, which meant a consolidation of the new Dutch state. Moreover in 1609 Amsterdam’s grown importance in the commercial and financial world found its expression in the foundation of the Exchange Bank (Wisselbank), which would make the Dutch ‘bank guilder’ the leading valuta in the international payment system during about two centuries. In 1609 it was clear that finance had definitively followed trade and industry northward.​[5]​
	In discussing developments on the Amsterdam capital market I will define ‘capital market’ as a situation in which a demand for and supply of money for a certain period of time against certain conditions can be perceived and/or in which the paper resulting from this can be traded. On the one hand there should be people or institutions that are ready to pay interest or dividends in exchange for the disposal of a sum of money during some time on certain conditions. On the other hand there should be people or institutions ready to make sums of money available in exchange for written acknowledgements. My discussion will not be restricted to situations in which debt paper has become - either or not anonymously - transferable to third parties. It did neither seem useful to me to exclude short-term credit from the discussion, because from early on short-term financing could be and was prolonged. A third point that deserves attention is the difference between forced loans and voluntary government loans. It seems reasonable to argue that where loans are forced there is no capital market, but in fact the distinction is not always that easy to make. Loans may be for instance partly forced and partly voluntary, or subscriptions to forced loans may have become negotiable.
My evaluation of developments on Amsterdam’s capital market during this period will be focused on some points of debate emerging from the recent literature. Was the rise of the Amsterdam’s capital market due to the wealth of the Antwerp merchants who entered Amsterdam in 1585? Did either VOC-share or rather government bonds provide a secondary market diminishing liquidity constraints for merchants in Amsterdam? Did the introduction of transferable VOC-shares ‘complete’ Holland’s ‘financial revolution’?​[6]​ I will start with an attempt to evaluate capital demand and supply in Amsterdam, in the government sector as well as in the private sector, before 1585. Secondly I will try to record the main changes since the start of the Revolt, and the contribution of Antwerp merchants to these changes after 1585. Thirdly I will discuss the relative importance of government bonds and VOC-shares in the developments on the capital market. The conclusion will summarise the answers to these questions.

1. Capital demand and supply in Amsterdam before 1585
Demand for capital came from early on as well from the private sector as from the government sector, local as well as central government.  Small-scale private activities may have been financed out of personal savings. But shipping and trade as well as the building of mills, houses, land reclamation etc. will normally have required financing at least partly by others. The city government needed loans to build city walls, a town hall, port facilities, etc. Besides this wars had to be financed. 
Public servants could be forced to supply loans to government, but since the fifteenth century the city of Amsterdam also sold life annuities and heritable annuities on the free market, for local expenditure as well as for the so-called ‘bede’, the sum of money to be paid to the prince.​[7]​ In 1515 cities in Holland at the request of Charles V sold for an amount of nearly 32,000 guilders on the market, 29% of which in Amsterdam. This shows that Amsterdam’s capital market was at that time already bigger than in other cities in Holland. But in the first decades of the sixteenth century additional buyers had yet to be found in Flanders to get Holland’s loans fully subscribed.​[8]​ In 1542-43 and in 1552 city officials and wealthy people were again forced to buy annuities to enable the prince to finance his wars at a rate of 6.25%. olHolla
In 1554 life-annuities and redeemable annuities could be sold on the free market at high interest rates of 16.7%, and 8.3%. Demand for life annuities in Amsterdam increased in the meantime. Local government granted some issues at an interest rate of only 12.5%, and even only 10%, not for any government need but to satisfy the community.​[9]​  The importance of the capital market in Amsterdam in Holland stands out from the fact that 40% of the nearly 1.1 million of life- and redeemable annuities sold in Holland on the free market between 1553 and 1565 were sold in Amsterdam.​[10]​ Already in 1543 the average amount in taxable wealth per person had been much higher in Amsterdam than in Holland’s next important city Delft: nearly 13,000 guilders per taxpayer as against not much more than 7,000 guilders per taxpayer in Delft.​[11]​
	 Amsterdam’s capital market was not yet very large, however, when compared to that of Antwerp. In 1550 Antwerp had a population of nearly 100,000, Amsterdam in 1550 only of about 25,000 to 30,000. Trade was of course a main source of capital formation. In this respect the relative position of Amsterdam and Antwerp in 1543 is shown by the fact that of the revenues of a tax on the value of exports in the Habsburg Empire no less than 72% came from Antwerp and only 7% from Amsterdam. ​[12]​  Antwerp was especially important to the prince as a source of huge amounts in short-term finance. The amount of the last loan Philip II was able to wrest from the Fuggers in Antwerp in 1556 before his bankruptcy had been no less than nearly one million guilders.​[13]​ In 1556 the capital value of total outstanding long term debt of Flanders was two million of Holland only about 750,000 guilders.​[14]​ 
	There was no doubt however that Amsterdam was growing in wealth and population during the sixteenth century already well before the Revolt. Shipping and trade had to develop to enable the import of the necessary Baltic grains to feed a growing population and the grain trade became a source of capital formation, which also supplied government demand. Of 103 annuity-buyers between 1542 and 1565 whose professions were known about half were merchants, and nearly half of those were grain dealers.​[15]​ Already between 1544 and 1554 Amsterdam became the staple for bulk transport from the Baltic Sea: of the trade in grain, wood, pitch, tar, in 1560 already 70% was in their hands. Much of this was brought to Sevilla. Besides salt, oil, wine and wool, Spanish silver came in return, which of course reinforced credit on the Amsterdam staple market.
The new chances in the grain trade also attracted foreign merchants, who in due time wished to become citizens of Amsterdam. Between 1531 and 1566 on average about four foreign merchants per year have been documented, and during this period twenty-five of them already came from the Southern Netherlands.​[16]​ In his thesis on merchants from the southern Netherlands and the rise of Amsterdam’s staple market Gelderblom found on average already about eight new merchants per year from the Southern Netherlands in his sources in the seven years before 1585.​[17]​ 

Table 1. 	Average number of merchants per year migrating to 






	Source: Gelderblom, Oscar, Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden en de opkomst van de Amsterdamse stapelmarkt (1578-1630), Hilversum, 2000, p. 86, 

He showed moreover that the so-called ‘rich trades’ in luxury products, in which profit margins were much higher than in the bulk trades, were not at all the exclusive business of merchants from the Southern Netherlands. He also found that merchants originating from the Southern Netherlands were in general not really much wealthier than merchants born in Amsterdam.​[18]​ He moreover showed that sophisticated financial instruments for capital formation in trade were already used in Amsterdam before the influx of Antwerp merchants in 1585. 
The rise of financial markets in the private sector during the sixteenth century is of course partly connected to the long delays before receiving returns on overseas investments. This required new forms of finance, capable of mobilising larger sums, with participants ready to wait for longer periods. This was not only true for the ocean trade, which was still in the hands of the Spanish and Portuguese, but also for overseas trade in Northern Europe. There are no figures as to the extent of demand and supply of capital in the private sector. There is no doubt however that it increased, as profit opportunities were evidently attractive enough to attract even foreign merchants.
For longer term investments in the private sector, for instance for ships, the instrument of the ‘partenrederij’ is well known already well before 1585 as can be shown for instance in 1536 by the archives of the merchant Claes van Adrichem.​[19]​ It offered the possibility to invest in small parts of on or several ships in order to spread risks. Although the ‘parten’ probably still tended to be shared by a closed circle of family members and acquaintances, they could nevertheless even already be sold. So-called bodemerij-loans or mortgages on ships are only documented since the 1590s. ​[20]​ But already before the Revolt there are detailed examples of groups of merchants in Amsterdam, often relatives, putting money together to start trading companies. There is incidentally even information on the rate of return on their capital.​[21]​ 
Advances, i.e. commodities paid ahead of delivery, were another important source of credit on the Amsterdam market.​[22]​ The use of bills of exchange to this end in Amsterdam, in which a creditor charged a debtor to pay a certain amount on a certain time and place to a third party, is documented already before 1585. Around 1550 their use had still been very limited in the Baltic area.​[23]​  But they were already known in Amsterdam before 1578.​[24]​ Bills of exchange had been the most important institutional credit instrument for the short term in Antwerp where their use and transferability had been regularized by giving it a legal basis. Their negotiability had been the most important financial innovation of the sixteenth century. A brokers’ list of 1579 from Amsterdam had already tariffs for bills of exchange on Antwerp and Danzig. No other broker’s list with prices has been preserved before 1585. The one of 1585 is already a printed one, however, and mentioned tariffs for bills of exchange already on nine places: Middelburg, Cologne, Frankfurt, Emden, Hamburg, Lubeck, Rouen, Sevilla and Lisbon.​[25]​ 
	This broker’s price list not only testifies the use of bills of exchange already before the influx of Antwerp merchants after the closure of the Scheldt. It also shows that important rich trades on Italy and the Levant were already present in Amsterdam before 1585 as it contains prices for about sixty different kinds of silk. The increase in the diversification of trade and the importance of brokers had already led to the establishment of a broker’s guild, regulated by the Amsterdam city government immediately after Amsterdam had joined the Revolt in 1578.​[26]​ Generally therefore, there is no doubt at all that the formation of a capital market in Amsterdam to supply government as well as private demand was already well under way before the start of the Revolt against Spain.

2. Capital demand and supply since the Revolt and the role of the Antwerp merchants
The demand for capital by ‘central’ government before and since the Revolt is summarized in table 2. It shows that a capital market for government debt hardly existed during the years between the start of the Revolt and about 1600. In the first decades of the Revolt the war had mainly to be financed out of war booty, taxation and foreign aid.​[27]​ All ‘loans’ were in fact forced contributions on which interest payments were promised.

Table 2. Capital supply for the central government before and since the Revolt
	total amount	average amount per year	average amount per issue	bought outside Holl.	bought in Amsterdam as % of bought in Holland 	interest  rate
1515-1534	forced          538,000​[28]​ 	27,000	38,000	42%	21%	6.25%
1543-1549	forced          158,000​[29]​ 	23,000	53,000	23%	7%	6.25%
1552-1559	voluntary  1,258,000​[30]​ 	157,000	84,000	67%	42%	¾   8.3%¼ 16.7%
1565	voluntary        107,000 	107,000	107,000	?		6.25%​[31]​
						
1572-1585	forced        2,214,000?	158,000?	205,000​[32]​	0%	(assessment in Cap. Imp. 18%)	
1586-1598			198,000			
1599-1610	forced        7,600,000?voluntary     4,200,000	forced  633,000 voluntary 350,000	535,000	0%		 
Sources: Tracy, A financial revolution, pp. 62, 89, 94, 98, 117; Liesker, R. y Fritschy, W., Gewestelijke financiën ten tijde van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden. Deel 4. Holland 1572-1795, The Hague, 2004, p. 120; Fritschy, “A financial revolution reconsidered”, p. 64; Hart, ‘t, y Burg, van de, ,“Renteniers and the recovery of Amsterdam’s credit” 202.

Holland’s public credit gradually got restored at the end of the sixteenth century. After 1600 the average amount in loans became much bigger than before.​[33]​ Part of it was voluntary, part of it still forced. Maybe the lack of sufficient supply on the voluntary market should be explained by a preference to invest in the private sector with its increasing investment opportunities in the rich trades as well as in the bulk trades.​[34]​ Before 1600, however, uncertainty about the feasibility of the Dutch state may also have played a role. This uncertainty will gradually have been removed by the military successes of prince Maurits in the 1590s (1584-1625) and the leadership and financial policy in Holland of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1586-1619). Until 1606 8.3% had still to be paid on provincial loans. Then it declined to 7.1%, but only at the end of our period, when the war against Spain was suspended by the Twelve Year Truce, the interest rate had decreased to the level of 6.25% that had been normal in the 1560s. 
The real ‘boom’ in the demand for capital by government and its steady supply on the market would only start after the end of the Truce in 1621, when the demand for loans would rise to on average nearly 4 million per year until 1648. We do not know how much of Holland’s debt was sold in Amsterdam. An indication may be that in 1585 Amsterdam had to provide for 18% in a ‘Capital Imposition’ in Holland, and that in 1651 16% of the interest on Holland’s debt had to be paid by the provincial receiver in the district of Amsterdam.​[35]​ This shows that as to its contribution to Holland’s government debt Amsterdam had become less dominant than in the decades before the Revolt. Magistrates and public servants in Holland’s government centre The Hague seem to have become much important investors in government debt than merchants in Amsterdam.
Table 3 shows that local government remained able to get voluntary loans in Amsterdam even before 1585, although in the 1570s these were mostly short-term loans that were prolonged and consolidated afterwards in the form of annuities. Interest payments had decreased to zero in 1578, but they were resumed in 1580.​[36]​ Table 3 also shows that the average amount borrowed by Amsterdam’s local government decreased and became rather insignificant after about 1600, when compared to the development of Holland’s public debt.

Table 3.	Amounts borrowed (voluntary) in annuities by the government of Amsterdam 1572-1608






Source: Burg, Martijn van der, y Hart,  Marjolein ‘t,“Renteniers and the recovery of Amsterdam’s credit” en Boone, Marc, Davids, Karel, y Janssens, Paul (dir.), Urban public debts, urban governments and the market for annuities in Western Europe, Turnhout, Brepols, 2003, pp. 197-216, pp. 202-203.

In the private sector there must have been an increase in credit and investment possibilities especially after 1585. At the same time in this sector the use of bills of exchange as an instrument of short-term credit increased. It must have been due to the increase in their use that city government decided to introduce in 1597 the statutory regulations of Antwerp regarding their endorsement, transfer and discount. Use of assignations on cashiers (kassiers) that could be endorsed had become common in Amsterdam by 1604. It has been suggested that they went back to 1585.​[38]​
Amsterdam’s city government came to fear a too extensive circulation of bills of exchange through the issue of unsecured bills of exchange by kassiers or by too many endorsements, by which uncertainty over their reliability could increase. An important reason for the establishment of the Exchange Bank (Wisselbank) in 1609 by the city government was fear of misuse of these new credit instruments. The discount rates on bills of exchange, as shown in table 4, demonstrate that before 1609 they were indeed still perceived as a more risky kind of investment than investments in government debt. The Wisselbank can be characterised as an old fashioned bank, because its explicit goal was not to widen credit possibilities, but to restrict them.
 
Table 4.	Interest rates on bills of exchange compared with those on Holland’s government debt.




Sources: P. Spufford, ‘Access to credit and capital in the commercial centers of Europe’ en Davids, Karel y Lucassen, Jan, (dir.) A miracle mirrored. The Dutch Republic in European perspective, Cambridge, 1995, p. 330; Fritschy,  Wantje, “A ‘financial revolution’ reconsidered: public finance in Holland during the Dutch Revolt, 1568-1648”, Economic History Review 56, 1 (2003) pp. 57-89, p. 64.

When the Wisselbank was established in 1609 the amount in accounts remained still relatively modest in the first years of its existence. Until 1617 it fluctuated between about 500,000 and one million guilders. But the interest rate on bills of exchange had decreased considerably in comparison with the period 1600-1604, which must either mean that the risk premium had disappeared or that capital supply for this purpose had become more abundant. The market will have been bigger than can be seen from these figures, because the activities of the ‘kassiers’ were not finished by the existence of the Wisselbank.​[39]​ As all bills of exchange over 600 guilders had to be drawn on the Wisselbank it seems reasonable to assume, however, that their share of the market must have been small in comparison with that of the Bank. The number of accountholders in the bank grew from 764 to about 1000 during the first years of its existence. This means that the average amount invested in an account per merchant was less than thousand guilders. This low amount is not really surprising as they had to pay interest for the right to have this account.
We do not know how exactly capital demand and supply for private enterprises in trade and shipping developed. But there is no doubt at all that there must have been an increase and that for these purposes much larger amounts were involved than before. In 1585 it was moreover decided to enlarge the city from 146 to 159 ha, in 1593 to 260 ha. New houses were bought, often with borrowed money, often also with speculative motives.​[40]​ But only after the new enlargement of the city in 1612 credit-expansion seems to have become too high and these speculations would in the 1620s result in a financial crisis.​[41]​ 
Investments in more or less temporary companies for special kinds of trade must have remained common. Much higher amounts may have been invested in these companies than the amounts that were present on accounts in the Wisselbank. We know about a ‘General Company for Guinea’ consisting of nine merchants each investing 10,000 guilders. The required capital for the first ‘Compagnie van Verre’ to the Indies in 1594 was 290,000 guilders. Nine merchants ‘and some other participants’ supplied the money. ​[42]​ The crew, 250 men, had to participate for at least two months pay.​[43]​ It seems reasonable to presume that the nine initiators invested at least half of the total capital, i.e. at least about 16,000 guilders per head. 
In 1602 it proved to be possible to raise the huge amount of 6,400,000 in shares in the VOC, of which 3.6 million guilders was raised in Amsterdam.​[44]​ The VOC was established to end devastating competition and to organise joint protection of the trade on the east, which had become of great importance to Amsterdam since colonial wares were no longer to be had from Antwerp. Half of the 6.4 million came from less than 200 investors. This implies an average investment in this group of about 16,000 guilders per person, i.e. probably about the same order of size as that in earlier companies.​[45]​ Among the investors were five Antwerp merchants who invested each more than 30,000 gld.​[46]​ Ten out of twenty two VOC-Bewindhebbers in 1602 originated from the Southern Netherlands. Of the capital in the VOC 40% came from people originating from Antwerp and 26% of the shareholders.​[47]​ In 1610 about one third of the merchants in Amsterdam were first generation merchants originating from Antwerp.​[48]​ This seems to indicate the importance of the Antwerp merchants for Amsterdam’s capital market, although as we saw Gelderblom found that Antwerp merchants coming to Amsterdam in 1585 were in general not richer than Amsterdam merchants at the time they arrived.
Clé Lesger published a study in 2001 about ‘trade in Amsterdam during the Revolt: merchants, commercial expansion and change in the spatial economy of the Netherlands between 1550 and 1630’.​[49]​ He vigorously reasserted in this study the importance of the Revolt, and especially of 1585, for Amsterdam’s rise as the commercial centre of the world, downplaying factors contributing to Amsterdam’s growth already before the Revolt. For him 1585 was a decisive external shock resulting in a shift of the international trade system to the north, which could never have been the result of internal commercial developments in the north in the years before 1585. According to him it was this shift that made Amsterdam the centre of both bulk trades ànd rich trades. He found that merchants in Amsterdam who specialised in the regions in Russia, Italy, Levant, textiles, colonial wares, were from Antwerp.​[50]​ Contrary to Gelderblom Lesger therefore emphasised the role of the merchants from Antwerp and the importance of the increase in their numbers in the development of the Amsterdam capital market. He moreover emphasised that knowledge about bills of exchange in Amsterdam was still mainly restricted to Southern Netherlanders also in Amsterdam and not really well-known outside their circles. He reports that in 1601 Amsterdam’s city government had invited ten merchants to explain them the use of bills of exchange. All ten came from the southern Netherlands.​[51]​ 
As we saw Gelderblom tended to downplay the importance of 1585 for the development of Amsterdam’s capital market. In fact both may be right. Gelderbom is right in demonstrating that migration to Amsterdam started already well before 1585, and in pointing moreover to the fact that probably less than 20% of the merchants leaving Antwerp actually went to Amsterdam, because they also went to places like Middelburg, London, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Cologne, Venice, Sevilla, Lissabon.​[52]​ He is also right, I think, in emphasizing that most of the merchants migrating since 1585 were not richer than Amsterdam merchants, and that the rise of the Amsterdam capital market is hardly connected to the wealth brought to Amsterdam by the Antwerp merchants in 1585. 
Lesger is right in emphasizing that 1585 really constituted a break because of the shift in the international trading system. This shift gave merchants in Amsterdam the stimulus as well as the possibility to capital formation on a much vaster scale than before. It seems to me that Lesger is also right in emphasizing that the financial know how of the Antwerp merchants was more developed than of those of Amsterdam, and that this must have been an asset in the realization of the new possibilities. 
On the other hand also the grain trade increased in importance after 1585. The poor harvests in Italy from 1586-1591, 1595 and 1597-8, which gave an extra impulse to the important grain trade, must have been an important stimulus for commerce. The continued importance of the grain trade is testified by the fact that not only in 1611 a big Bourse for trade had been built but that this would be followed by the foundation of a separate grain bourse in 1617.​[53]​ Anyhow the rise of Amsterdam as a financial centre was rather the result than the cause of its development as the commercial centre of the world. 

3. VOC-shares, Holland’s public debt and the rise of a secondary market. 
As to the role of VOC-shares in the development of Amsterdam’s capital market Gelderblom and Jonker published a very interesting article under the title ‘Completing a financial revolution: the finance of the Dutch East India trade and the rise of the Amsterdam capital market, 1595-1612’.​[54]​ In it they argued that the financing of the Dutch East India Trade by means of the VOC in 1602, had completed Holland’s ‘financial revolution’ as defined by Tracy. Moreover according to them VOC-shares started to fulfil a function in diminishing liquidity constraints by being transferable on a secondary market.​[55]​ Besides this they denied that governments bonds might have fulfilled this function already before, because they never found evidence of transfers between merchants of government bonds in this period, nor of prices. Without prices no market, without market no trade, they argue, and they emphasize that they found ample evidence of trade in VOC-shares, not only because transfers were registered in the VOC-ledgers, but also because we know about price-fluctuations of VOC-shares. 
It seems debatable however if these developments can be termed ‘the completion of a financial revolution’. Dickson coined this term for developments in Britain during the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century​[56]​ and Tracy proposed to use it for developments in Holland in the sixteenth century. For both of them the financial revolution had consisted in a dramatic rise in public borrowing to finance wars, coupled with a shift from short-term to long-term debt in the form of low-rate securities, guaranteed by a representative body and funded by hypothecated revenues. In Britain the establishment of the Bank of England, as the main intermediary between government and the capital market, had completed the financial revolution, not the rise of a secondary market in shares. In Holland, the Wisselbank had been established to restrict credit-expansion not to stimulate it. The remarkable thing in Holland after the Revolt had been that during the first quarter of a century after the start of the Revolt long term loan financing by the States of Holland had proved to be no longer possible. The financing of the Revolt in the decisive first twenty-five years had been realised mainly by what rather might be called a tax revolution.​[57]​ 
The remarkable thing in Holland was moreover that when loan financing became possible again and the States of Holland tried to consolidate short-term obligations in long-term annuities, they failed. The debt holders happened to prefer obligations. This can be explained by the fact that obligations were more easily transferable, because, contrary to annuities, they could be ‘bearer bonds’: they did not have to mention the name of the holder. That is the reason why Dutch obligations, which at least until 1600 had always been the typical short term paper became the typical long term bond of Holland, not by any revolution but very gradually.​[58]​ Anyhow, the possibility to buy and sell VOC-shares does not seem to have been a financial revolution in accordance with the characteristics mentioned by Dickson and Tracy. 
Lastly Gelderblom’s and Jonker’s claim that VOC-shares rather than government bonds fulfilled a function in diminishing liquidity constraints for merchants because they were transferable on a ‘secondary market’ seems to be dabatable. I am inclined to argue that a paper with volatile prices like VOC-shares, which could be influenced by rumours about trade supplies from the Indies, is typically not very suitable to fulfil this function. It seems more probable that trade in VOC-share was mainly fed by speculative motives and that it was exactly the stability of the value of Holland’s governments bonds that made them much more fit to fulfil this function of a ‘secondary liquidity’.  The main reason why there is written evidence of the transfers of VOC-shares and not of the Dutch obligations is precisely that transfers of VOC-shares had to be inscribed in the ledgers. This was not the case with obligations, and that was exactly what must have made them of course much more easily transferable than VOC-shares.
Curiously enough the authors state in their conclusion that still in 1650 only 60% of Hollands debt consisted in obligaties or bearer bonds, the remainder consisting in life-annuities and heritable redeemable annuities. They do not mention that at that time this 60% was an amount of 77 million guilders in bonds, much more than the 9 million in VOC-shares of which only a fraction circulated in trade. They moreover simply ignored the fact that especially in Amsterdam only 2% of Holland’s debt had the form of redeemable annuities, 12% that of life-annuities and no less than 86% that of these bearer bonds.
Of course VOC-shares were traded and of course they will have been used as collateral for loans among merchants. At the same time I would argue however, firstly, that the lack of direct sources for the existence of trade in obligaties is the logical outcome of their easy transferability without the need of registration. Secondly I would argue that the probability that obligaties rather than VOC-shares will have fulfilled a function in the diminishing of liquidity constraints of merchants is confirmed by the high preference for obligations especially in Amsterdam.

Conclusion
Developments on Amsterdam’s capital market until 1609 may be summarised as follows. Before the Revolt against Spain demand for and supply of capital in Amsterdam, in the private as as well in the government sector, was more voluminous than in other Dutch cities, but much smaller than in Antwerp. Despite the so-called ‘financial revolution’ in sixteenth Holland the success of the Revolt against Spain in the first decennia after 1572 was nevertheless not caused by the possibilities offered to the States of Holland by Amsterdam’s capital market.  This was not only due to the fact that Amsterdam joined the revolt only in 1578, but also to the fact that Holland’s credit was restored only in about 1600. To some extent the States of Holland relied on the credit of the individual cities, but often they chose for forced loans. Even after 1600 forced loans still remained a necessary complement to loans on the free market, perhaps partly due to uncertainty about the viability of the new Dutch state, partly because other investment opportunities were more attractive. In the meantime urban loan demand on Amsterdam’s capital market became remarkably insignificant after the Revolt in comparison to provincial and private demand and in comparison to the situation in the sixteenth century. 
The foundation of the VOC was a big event on Amsterdam’s capital market in the beginning of the seventeenth century, although already in the years before investments in private trading companies turned out to have been often quite substantial. There is not much reason however to characterise the subsequent tradability of VOC-shares on a secondary market as the completion of a financial revolution as defined by Dickson and Tracy. Neither is it very probable that the tradability of VOC-shares will have contributed to the liquidity needs of merchants, as transfer was much more cumbersome than that of Holland’s obligaties and prices were rather volatile. It is much more probable therefore that  obligaties of Holland’s government fulfilled that function. Especially after the Twelve Year Truce Holland’s government cannot fail to have been by far the biggest actor on the market and there is no reason to believe that the value of Holland’s obligaties will have departed much from 100%.
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